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ABSTRACT 
Chaos theory  offers a  new  mode of analyzing  the complexity of  nonlinear  (economic) 
dynamics.  A  growing  list  of  applications  is  mainly  focused  on modeling  macroeconomic 
(growth  and  business)  cycles  and  dynamic  (consumer’s  and  firms’)  choice.  This  paper 
provides a  nonlinear  dynamic  model  of  Cournot competition. The model  improves  upon 
Rand  (1978)  and  Dana  and  Montrucchio  (1986)  by  permitting  monopoly  output  to  be 
positive. The existence of  chaotic regimes  is  proven  and simulation  experiments illustrate 
the  implications. 
I. CHAOTIC PATTERNS IN  ECONOMICS 
In  the  1970s and  1980s chaos theory  broke and  still  ((breaks across 
the  lines  that  separate scientific  disciplines.  Because  it  is  a  science  of 
the global  nature of systems it  has brought together  thinkers from  fields 
that  had  been  widely  separated)) (Gleick,  1987,  p.  3). Gleick  (1987, 
Chapter  2)  does  not  hesitate  to  characterize  the  rise  of  chaos  theory 
as  a  revolution,  since  it  ((has become  not just  a  canon  of  belief  but 
also  a  way  of  doing  science.  ...  Some  carry  out  their  work  explicitly 
denying  that  it  is  a  revolution;  others  deliberately  use  Kuhn’s  language 
of  paradigm  shifts  to  describe  the changes  they  witness)) (pp.  38-39). 
The  essential  notion  of  chaos  theory  is  that  (even  simple)  dynamic 
systems may  generate  seemingly  random and chaotic  patterns.  Irregular 
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and unpredictable time  paths result  from  deterministic  sources.  Baumol 
and  Quandt  (1985)  offer  the  illustrative,  if  imprecise,  description  that 
(([clhaos  is  defined  as a  fully deterministic  behaviour  pattern  which  is, 
in  at least  some  respects,  undistinguishable  from a  random  process  or, 
rather,  a  process  perturbed  by  substantial  random elements.  It displays 
extreme  sensitivity  to changes in  parameter  values,  and  is  characterized 
by  an infinite number  of  equilibria  each  approached  by  (superimposed) 
cycles of different periodicities,  and whose simultaneous presence is  what 
gives  the  appearance  of  randomness  to  a  time  series  generated  by 
a  deterministic  process))  (p.  3).  Chaos  theory  reaches  an  analytical 
apparatus which  has found  application  in  many  scientific  disciplines. 
This  paper  loosely  defines  chaos  as  to  three  features  of  dynamic 
trajectories:  (i)  sensitive  dependence  on initial  conditions;  (ii)  existence 
of  periodic  orbits  of  all  periods;  and  (iii)  existence  of  an  uncountable 
set of  initial conditions that each  give  rise  to (asymptotically) aperiodic 
time  paths (Kelsey,  1988, p.  9).  The point  of  departure is  a  first-order 
difference  equation, 
which  can  be  associated  with  chaotic trajectories  if  nonlinearity  gives 
a hill-shaped  function. The key point is that (([ilt cannot be too strongly 
emphasised  that  the  process  is  generic  to  most  functions  [(I)]  with 
a hump qftunahle steepness)) (May, 1976, p. 461, italics added). Particular 
specifications of equation  (I)  can  give  a  sequence  of  bifurcations  such 
that ((the pattern  never  repeats)) (May, 1976, p. 461).  For  the  moment, 
this  intuition  suffices.  An  excellent,  general  review  of  the  merits  of 
nonlinear  dynamics is  May  (1976), whereas  Kelsey  (1988) and  Baumol 
and  Benhabib  (1989)  offer  nice  introductions  of  chaos  theory  in 
economics. 
In  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s  the  methodology  of  nonlinear 
dynamics  also  entered  the  economic  scenery. The most  widespread  use 
of chaos theory lies in the field of macroeconomic (business and growth) 
cycles  (Stutzer,  1980;  Benhabib  and  Day,  1980 and  1982;  Day,  1982 
and  1983; Dana and  Malgrange,  1984; Day and  Shafer,  1985 and  1987; 
Grandmont, 1985 and  1986; Boldrin  and  Montrucchio,  1986; Deneckere 
and  Pelikan,  1986;  and  Julien,  1988).  These  models  induce  ((the 
profession’s  growing awareness of  the fact  that, even  in  the absence of 
extraneous  shocks,  the  internal  (nonlinear)  dynamics  of  an  economy 
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‘chaotic’ deterministic trajectories,  that may  be  hard  to distinguish  from 
‘truly random’ time series ... . Indeed, the recent approach to endogenous 
business cycles relies often  on advances made lately  in  the mathematical 
theory  of  nonlinear  dynamical  systems,  in  particular  the  analysis  of 
sudden qualitative changes displayed  by  their trajectories (‘bifucations’))) 
(Grandmont  and  Malgrange,  1986, p.  4) (I). 
The  second  class  of  applications  of  chaos  theory  to  economic 
frameworks  are  nonlinear  models  of  (consumers’  and  firms’)  dynamic 
choice  (Rand,  1978;  Benhabib  and  Day,  1981;  Baumol  and  Quandt, 
1985;  Dana  and  Montrucchio,  1986;  Granovetter  and  Soong,  1986; 
Rasmussen  and  Mosekilde,  1988; and  Iannaccone,  1989). These contri- 
butions ctshow that rational choice in  a stationary environment can lead 
to erratic behaviour ... . We mean by  erratic behaviour  choice sequences 
that do not  converge to a  long-run  stationary  value  or to any  periodic 
pattern))  (Benhabib  and  Day,  1981,  p.  459).  A  particular  type  of 
nonlinear  models  of  dynamic  choice  focuses  on  Cournot competition 
(Rand,  1978;  and  Dana  and  Montrucchio,  1986).  This  paper  offers 
a constructive critique  of the  two existing  nonlinear  models  of Cournot 
(duopoly) competition. 
The paper  is  organized  as follows.  Section  2  describes  the  essential 
features  of  the  two  existing  nonlinear  models  of  Cournot  (duopoly) 
competition.  A  basic  flaw  of  these  models  is  the  (implicit)  assumption 
that  monopoly  output is  zero.  Section  3  presents  a  model  of  Cournot 
duopoly  competition  which  permits  monopoly  output  to  be  positive. 
Section  4  illustrates  the  model’s  features  with  the  help  of  the  results 
of  simulation  experiments.  Section  5  briefly  indicates  the  applicability 
of  the  analytical  apparatus of  nonlinear  dynamics  to  topics  of  theory 
of competition  in  industrial  organization. 
2.  NONLINEAR MODELS OF COURNOT COMPETITION 
Examples of the introduction of  chaos theory in  industrial organization 
are  scarce.  Dana  and  Montrucchio  (1986)  argue  that  (([tlhe  only 
exception  is  the  seminal  paper  of  Rand  ...,  which  shows,  in  a  very 
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abstract  manner,  that  the  Cournot  titonnement  in  a  duopoly  model 
may  display  a  complicated  dynamical  structure))  (p.  41).  The  current 
state  of  the  art  is  not  much  different.  Only  Dana  and  Montrucchio’s 
(1986)  treatment  of  Cournot  duopoly  models  provides  a  further 
contribution  to  the  application  of  nonlinear  dynamics  to  topics  in 
industrial organization (’).  The nonlinear models of Cournot competition 
indicate  that  rivalry  in  a  market  can  be  associated  with  turbulent 
movements of the firms’ quantities if the competitors’ reaction  functions 
are hill-shaped. 
Recall  that  the  Cournot  (1838)  duopoly  model  implies  that  a  firm 
i chooses a supply quantity  (qi)  so as to maximize a profit  (xi)  function, 
conditional  upon  the  quantity  offered  by  the  rival j  # (q’), 
Max xi =  p (qi + qj) .  qi  -  ci  (qi), 
4‘ 
where  p  denotes the  inverse  demand function  and  so  price  and  c  the 
cost  of  production.  Solving  the  maximand  (2) gives  the  first-order 
condition 
p (qi + 4’) + qi ’ dp/d(q’ + qj) . (  1 + dqj/dq‘) -  dc’/dq’ = 0.  (3) 
From  condition  (3) the  firm’s  reaction  function  follows: 
qi = ri(qJ),  (4) 
where  i, j = 1,  2  and  i #,j with  the Nash  assumption that a firm expects 
a  passive  reaction  of  the  rival  upon  its  quantity  strategy  (dqj/dqi = 0). 
In  the  standard Cournot duopoly models (Tirole,  1988) chaotic patterns 
cannot emerge,  since  the  rivals’  reaction  functions  (4)  are assumed  to 
be  linear  or  insufficiently  nonlinear  (i.e., without  a  hill-shape). 
The introduction  of nonlinear dynamics in  a Cournot duopoly model 
requires  that at least  one of  the  rivals’ reaction  functions is hill-shaped. 
The  reason  is  straightforward.  Suppose  that  neither  of  the  reaction 
functions takes a hill-shaped  form; that is  dri/dqj I  (or  2)  0 for q’  2 0, 
where  i,  j  = 1, 2  and  i #j. Assume  that rival  1  and  2  react  according 
(’)  A  further  exception  is  perhaps  Baumol  and  Quandt’s (1985) nonlinear  model  of 
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to the time sequence ..., t -  I, t, t + I, ... . For example, if rival  1  offers 
a  quantity  q:-l  at time  t -  1,  then  rival  2  reacts  by  supplying  q:  at 
r,  which  provokes  rival  1’s  reaction  q:+l  at  t + I,  etcetera.  Then, 
qf+l  = r’(q!) so  that  qf+l  = ri[r’(qi-l)] =  ki(qf-l).  Now,  dk’ldqf-,  = 
= dr’/dqi . dr’/dqf-,  5  (or  2)  0.  Hence,  the  absence  of  hill-shaped 
reaction  functions  implies  that  the  second-order  difference  equation  of 
a  rival’s  quantities  shows  not  even  a  single  hump. 
Rand’s  (1978)  approach  to  the  Cournot  duopoly  model  is  very 
abstract  indeed  by  directly  postulating  unspecified  reaction  functions 
with  sufficient  nonlinearity.  Rand  treats  an  example  of  an  analytical 
hill-shaped  function and a nonanalytical  tent map. Analytical hill-shaped 
first-order  difference  equations  can  have  chaotic  regimes  (Section  I). 
Besides,  nonanalytical  first-order  difference  equations  can  also  give 
chaotic  patterns for  particular  ranges of  parameter  values  (May,  1976, 
p. 465).  Dana and  Montrucchio  (1986) supplement  Rand’s treatment of 
chaotic  behavior  in  Cournot duopoly  models  by,  among  other  things, 
providing  five  specified examples. Given  the  desired  hill-shaped  specifi- 
cation of the reaction function(s), they derive (an) associated specification 
of  profit  function(s). 
Both  Rand’s  and  Dana  and  Montrucchio’s  reaction  curves have  the 
shape which  is  depicted  in  Exhibit  1  (for  the  analytical  case). 
Exhibit  I. Hill-shaped  Cournot  reaction  curve  with  zero monopoly  output. 
The ad  hoc  assumption  of  hill-shaped  reaction  functions in  Rand’s  and 
Dana and Montrucchio’s analyses leaves an essential question unanswered: 
Can  an  economic  rationale  be  provided  for  the  (very  complicated) 
nonlinear  shape  of  the  profit  functions?  Kelsey  (1988)  points  out  that I66  A. vun  Witteloostuijn  und  A.  vun  Liet 
the  ((shapes of the reaction  functions [Rand]  assumes are very  extreme 
indeed.  It  does  not  look  like  they  could  be  generated  by  plausible 
demand  and cost  functions)) (p.  19). 
One  observation  immediately  strikes  the  eye.  The  usual  illustration 
of  a  hill-shaped  curve  implies  that  r'(0) =  qi  = 0.  The  reaction  curves 
in  Rand (1978) and Dana and Montrucchio (1986) all show this feature. 
This means  that the (implicit)  assumption  is  imposed  that firm  i offers 
a zerg output in  response to firm js  zero production:  that is, monopoly 
output is taken to be zero! However, this assumption is  not very realistic. 
This  extreme  case  can  be  bypassed  by  introducing  a  qL = r'(0) > 0, 
where qL  represents  firm  i's  monopoly  output (which, for example, can 
follow  from  the  standard  maximization  procedure  of  a  monopolist). 
Exhibit  2  illustrates  the  shape  of  this  reaction  function. 
Exhibit  2.  Hill-shaped  Cournot  reaction  curve  with  positive  monopoly output. 
The hill-shaped  Cournot reaction  curve with  positive  monopoly  output 
induces  a  further  question:  Can  a  proof  of  the  existence  of  chaotic 
regimes still  be  provided?  Section  3  goes  on to examine both  questions 
of  economic  interpretation  and  proof  of  existence. 
3. COURNOT REACTION  CURVES WITH  POSITIVE  MONOPOLY  OUTPUT 
3.1.  Economic  Rationale 
3.1,1.  Asymmetric  Reaction  Pattern 
The  critical  implication  of  the  hill-shape  of  a  reaction  function  is 
that a  firm  shows an asymmetric reaction  pattern. For q'  < q$  (Exhibit Chaotic puttem.v  in  Cournot  competition  167 
2) firm  i  and j’s  supplies  are positively  correlated,  whereas  q’  > q$  is 
associated  with  a  negative  relationship  between  qi  and  qj.  Hence,  for 
0 I  qj < qi firm  i  acts  as  a  ,follower  or  imitator.  If  firm  j  expands 
output, so  does  firm  i.  Whenever  firm  j  contracts  supply,  firm  i  too 
introduces a decrease of the quantity offered. However, if firm j  expands 
its  output beyond  96,  then  firm  i  starts to  act  as a ,fringe  competitor 
or accomrnodator.  On  the  one hand,  whenever  firm j  expands  output, 
firm  i simply  adapts to  reduced  residual  demand. On  the  other  hand, 
if  firm j  contracts output, then  firm  i adopts an  aggressive  strategy  by 
expanding  its  supply. 
The asymmetric  reaction  pattern  follows  from  the  switch  in  sign  of 
the first-order derivative of the reaction curve. A  firm with an asymmetric 
reaction  pattern  can  be  called  a  dualist:  that  is,  the  firm’s  reply  can 
be  to  imitate  as well  as to  accommodate,  depending  on  the  scale  of 
the  rival’s  output. The reaction  curve  of  a  dualist  is  hill-shaped. 
3.1.2. Strategic  Substitutes  and  Complements 
Types  of  reaction  patterns  can  be  distinguished  as to the  features of 
the  cross-partial  derivatives  of  the  firm’s  marginal  profit  with  respect 
to  its  opponents’  action  (Bulow  et  a[.,  1986,  pp.  491-497; and  Tirole, 
1988,  p.  208).  Here  it  suffices  to  note  that  ((with strategic  substitutes 
B’s optimal response to more aggressive play by  A  is to be less aggressive 
... . With  strategic  complements  B  responds  to  more  aggressive  play 
with  more  aggressive  play)) (Bulow  et  af.,  1986,  p.  494).  In  terms  of 
Cournot  competition  this  means  that  strategic  substitutes  predict 
dr‘/dqj < 0,  whereas  strategic  complements  indicate  dr‘/dqJ > 0. 
Hence,  the  substitute  or complement  nature  of  the  firm’s  reaction 
pattern is  reflected  in  the sign of  the  reaction  curve’s slope.  Both  cases 
are depicted  in  Exhibit  3  (Tirole,  1988, p.  208). 
The  reaction  function  which  follows  from  strategic  complements 
(curves  I),  describes  the  reaction  pattern  of  an  imitator,  whereas  an 
accommodator’s  responses  are  reflected  in  the  reaction  curve  with 
strategic  substitutes  (curves  11). 
3.1.3. Idle  Capacity 
Bulow  et  al.  (1985,  p.  180,  Fig.  1)  provide  an  answer  to  the  first 
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Exhibit  3.  Strategic  substitutes  and  complements. 
curves  with  positive  monopoly  output in  terms  of  strategic  substitutes 
and  complements.  Here  the  following  brief  intuition  suffices.  Starting 
from  monopoly  output a  firm  is  willing  to  increase  supply  in  reaction 
upon entry, which contradicts the downward slope of standard Cournot 
reaction curves: that is, starting from  monopoly output the firm  regards 
outputs  as  strategic  complements.  This  assumption  follows  from  the 
literature  on  entry  deterrence.  Two  arguments  offer  a  case  in  point. 
First,  the  aggressive  strategy  after  entry  is  described  in  the  literature 
on  idle  capacity  as  an  entry-deterring  instrument  (Spence,  1977  and 
1979; and Ware,  1985). Second,  the  post-entry  expansion  policy  can  be 
grounded  in  long-run  reputation  arguments, even  if  this strategy  is  not 
profit-maximizing  from  a  short-run  perspective  (Milgrom  and  Roberts, 
1982 and  1987; and  Arvan,  1986). 
However, the expansion  policy does not pay  if the rival’s scale moves 
beyond  a  particular  point.  After  a  certain  scale  of  expansion  (qT)  the 
benefit  of accommodation  starts to dominate over the advantage of  the 
aggressive strategy, which  implies that the standard downward  slope of 
the  Cournot reaction  curve  sets  in:  that  is,  the  firms  consider  outputs 
to  be  strategic  substitutes.  The  hill-shape  of  Cournot  reaction  curves 
can follow from demand specifics. The key point is that the ((assumption 
that  each  firm’s  marginal  revenue  is  always  decreasing  in  the  other’s 
output  ...  is  quite  a  restrictive  assumption.  For  example  it  is  never 
satisfied  in  the  relevant  range  for  economists’ second-favourite  demand 
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3.2. Proof  of  Existence 
3.2.  I. Li  and  Yorke’s Theorem 
Granovetter and Soong (1 986, pp. 92-93) provide a graphical intuition 
which  suggests  that  chaotic  regimes  can  occur  in  hill-shaped  functions 
with  a  positive  intercept  (in  a  model  of  nonlinear  consumers’  choice) 
without, however, offering a proof. Li  and Yorke (I 975) provide however 
a  theorem  which  can  be  used  to prove the  existence of chaotic regimes. 
This  paper  employs  an  abbreviate  version  of  this  theorem. 
Theorem  I: The first-order  difference  equation  (I)  gives chaotic regimes 
if  there  exists  a  value  of  x,  such  that 
Following  Day  (1982  and  1983)  Li  and  Yorke’s  theorem  can  be 
re-expressed  as 
f(xrn)  XC <  x* <  xm,  (6) 
where 
xm  =f(x’) = max ,f(x) > 0  and  ,f(xC)  = x*.  (7) 
If  the  function f(x) is  hill-shaped,  the  inequality  x* <  xm is  equivalent 
to x  <  x* and the inequality ,f(xm)  5 xc  can be formulated as ,f’ (xm)  I XI, 
where ,f2  =  ,f[,f(.)]. Then, the theorem of Li and Yorke can be expressed 
as 
f2(Xm) 5 x’ <  xm.  (8) 
Form (8) will  be  used  to prove  that there  exists an uncountable set  of 
initial  conditions  that  give  rise  to  chaotic  time  paths for  a  significant 
class  of  hill-shaped  reaction  functions  with  positive  monopoly  output. 
Three  cases  are considered:  (i)  one firm  (re)acts  as a  dualist,  whereas 
(3) Hence,  if there  exists a  three-period  cycle, then  there  are  chaotic regimes  as  well. 
This  result  is  related  to  Sarkovskii’s (1964) theorem  (Kelsey,  1988, p.  5). 170  A.  van  Wiifclr~osfuijn  and  A.  van  Lirr 
the  rival  is  an  imitator  (Subsection  3.2.2); (ii)  one  firm  is  a  dualist, 
while  the  rival  responds  as an  accommodator (Subsection  3.2.3); and 
(iii)  both  rivals  behave  as  dualists  (Subsection  3.2.4).  It  appears  that 
all  three  cases  can  be  associated  with  chaotic  reaction  patterns. 
3.2.2. Dualist  Against  Imitator 
The reaction  function  of  firm  i,  ri(qi), is  assumed  to be  hill-shaped 
(with  positive  monopoly  output), whereas  the  reaction  function  of  firm 
j  is supposed  to resemble rj(qi)  = qi. This scenario describes competition 
between  a  dualist and a  perfect  imitator.  Rival  i and j  react  according 
to  the  time  sequence  ...,  t -  I,  t, t + 1,  ... . This  means  that 
With  doubled  lengths  of  the  time  intervals  equation  (9)  has  the  same 
form  as  the  first-order  nonlinear  difference  equation  (I).  Exhibit 
4  illustrates  the  applicability  of  Theorem  I  to a  first-order  difference 
equation which resembles Exhibit  2's  hill-shaped  Cournot reaction curve 
with  positive  monopoly  output  (the  dualist,  curve  I)  and  the  45O-line 
(the  perfect  imitator,  curve  11). 
Exhibit  4. Dualist  against  imitator. 
This  paper  uses  the  specification 
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for  the  dualist’s  hill-shaped  reaction  curve. 
For  a  significant  class  of  second-degree  reaction  functions  ri  with 
positive  monopoly  output and  assuming  that  firm j  acts  as  a  perfect 
imitator,  the  existence  of  chaotic  regimes  can  be  proven  algebraically 
with  the  use  of  condition  (8).  Following  Rand  (1978)  and  Dana  and 
Montrucchio  (1986)  output is  scaled  to  qi, qjE[O,  I].  If  ri(l)  = 0 and 
the  maximum  of  ri is  I,  then  condition  (8)  indicates  that  a  necessary 
condition  for  proving  Li  and  Yorke’s  chaos is  r’(0)  x*.  That is,  the 
monopoly  output is  restricted  by  the  upperbound  X*  (i.e.,  the  location 
of  the  maximum). 
Proposition  1: If  qi = ri(qj)  = 1 -  CI .  (qj -  1 + I/&)z  and  =  rj(&  =  qi, 
there  exists  an  uncountable  set  of  initial  conditions  with  chaotic 
(asymptotically  aperiodic)  time  paths  and  for  every  natural  number 
k  there  exists  a  time  path  with  period  k  for  3.0795 ... s ct < 4. 
The  proof  of  Proposition  1  is  offered  in  Appendix  A.  Proposition 
1  indicates  that  Cournot  duopoly  competition  can  be  associated  with 
chaotic trajectories  if a dualist (that is, a firm with a hill-shaped  reaction 
function)  competes  against  a  perfect  imitator,  even  when  monopoly 
output is  assumed  to be  positive. 
Proposition  1 is robust  as regards to modifications of the assumption 
that  rival  j  (re)acts  as  a  perfect  imitator.  First,  take  the  case  where 
competitor j  only  imitates  imperfectly. 
Proposition 2:  If  the  reaction  function of  firm  i  has the parabolic  form 
as indicated  in  Proposition  1 but with  3.0795 ... <  ct < 4,  then  the  case 
where  the  reaction  function  of  rival j  reflects  imperfect  imitation  also 
gives  rise  to chaotic time  paths. 
The proof  of  Proposition  2  is  given  in  Appendix  B. The key  point 
is that the  reaction  function  of  firm j  is  turned  into rj(qi)  = qi + 6(qi), 
where  6 (qi) indicates  a  small  disturbance.  The  composed  reaction 
function  ri(rj) then  has  the  same  shape  as  the  one  in  the  proof  of 
Proposition  I,  except  for  a  small  disturbance  term,  so  that  Li  and 
Yorke’s condition can still be satisfied if the disturbance is small enough. 
3.2.3. Duahst  Against  Accommodator 
The assumption  that  rival j  (re)acts  as an  imitator,  can  be  dropped 
in  favor of the well-established  case which assumes a downward sloping I72  A. vun  Witteloosruijn  und  A.  vun  Licv 
Cournot  reaction  curve.  That  is,  the  dualist  i (reaction  curve  I)  faces 
an  accommodator  j  (reaction  function  11).  This  scenario  is  illustrated 
in  Exhibit  5. A for perfect  accommodation. This means  that the accom- 
modator j  (re)acts  according  to rj(qi)  = 1 -  qi  =  qj. 
Exhibit  5.  A.  Dualist  against  accommodator.  B.  Composed  reaction  function. 
Exhibit 5 shows graphically that Li  and Yorke’s theorem can be applied. 
The composed  reaction  function  (Exhibit  5.B) can  be  used  to illustrate 
that condition (6) does hold.  By  making use  of Proposition  1  this result 
can  be  proven  algebraically. 
Proposition  3: If the  reaction  function  of  firm  i has the parabolic  form 
as indicated in Proposition  1 with  3.6708 ... I  c1  < 4, then the case where 
the  reaction  function  of  rival j  reflects  perfect  accommodation  is  also 
associated  with  chaotic  time  paths. 
Proposition  3’s  proof  is  presented  in  Appendix  C.  Proposition 
3  indicates  that  Cournot  accommodation  can  also  give  chaotic  time 
patterns  if  one  of  the  two  firms  decides  on  the  basis  of  a  hill-shaped 
reaction  function  with  a  positive  intercept  (i.e., if  one  of  the  rivals  is 
a  dualist  with  positive  monopoly  output). 
3.2.4. Dualist  Against  Dualist 
The third case describes the scenario where  both  firms have the same 
hill-shaped  reaction  function  with  positive  monopoly  output.  That  is, 
the  two  rivals  behave  as dualists.  This case is  depicted  in  Exhibit  6.A. 
Exhibit  6.B graphically proves  the existence of  Li  and  Yorke’s chaos. 
The analytical  proof  follows  from  Proposition  1. Exhibit  6. A.  Dualist  against  dualist.  B.  Composed  reaction  function. 
Proposition  4: If  the  reaction  functions  of  firm  i  and j  have  identical 
hill-shaped  forms,  chaotic  regimes  can  be  derived. 
Proposition  4  is  proven  in  Appendix  D.  Proposition  4  predicts  that 
Cournot  competition  between  two  rivals  which  are  making  use  of 
equivalent hill-shaped  reaction  functions with  positive monopoly  output, 
can  be  associated  with  chaotic  trajectories  of  output. 
4. SIMULATION  EXAMPLES 
4.1.  Functional  Specifications 
The  implications  of  hill-shaped  Cournot  reaction  curves  can  be 
illustrated  through  simulation  of  competition  for  a  series  of  (coun- 
ter-)moves (').  The simulation  experiments cover  120 moves  (or periods 
t = 1,  ...,  120): that is,  both  rivals  act  and  react  60  times.  Rival  i sets 
supply  in  odd-numbered  periods  (t = 1, 3,  5, ...,  119),  whereas  rival J?s 
replies  are  effectuated  at even-numbered  dates  (t = 2,  4,  6, ...,  120). 
Two  initializations  dictate  the  simulation  results.  First,  by  varying  the 
value  of  the  parameter  (a) the  steepness  of  the  hill-shaped  reaction 
function  (10)  can  be  tuned.  Second,  variation  of  the  first  move  (4;) 
manipulates  the  initial  competitive  condition, 
The experiments simulate the dualist against imitator rivalry (Subsection 
3.2.2). Firm  i is  the  dualist  [qi = ri(qj)  = 1 -  a . (qj -  1 +  and 
(4)  For  example,  Baumol  and Quandt  (1985)  an Baumol  (1986) also offer  interesting 
simulation examples, whereas Sterman (1989) presents the results of an experimental study. I74  A.  vun  Wi/rch)s/uiin und  A.  vun  Licv 
firm j  acts as a  perfect  imitator [qj = r’(qi) = qi]. Since  the  results are 
similar  for  both  rivals,  this  section  presents  only  firm  i’s  outputs (at 
odd-numbered  periods).  Exhibit  7  indicates  the  initial  values  of  the 
simulation  experiments. 
Exhibit  Simulation  Initial  monopoly  Steepness 
experiment  output  parameter 
I  0.3 10  3.35  8 
II  0.300  3.35  9 
111  0.310  3.34  10  and  12 
IV  0.998  3.35  11 
Exhibit  7. Initial  values  simulation  experiments. 
The simulation experiments reveal three properties  of complex dynamics: 
(i) chaotic  regimes  for  particular  parameter  values  (Subsection 4.2);  (ii) 
sensitive  dependence  on  initial  conditions  (Subsection  4.3);  and  (iii) 
sudden  breaks  in  qualitative  patterns  (Subsection  4.4).  These  features 
can  pose  serious  problems  to econometric estimation  (Subsection  4.5). 
4.2. Chaotic  Trajectories 
The  first  consequence  of  nonlinear  dynamics  can  of  course  be  the 
occurrence of chaotic trajectories.  If  rival  firms are engaged  in  Cournot 
competition  while  at  least  one  competitor  is  making  supply  decisions 
on  the  basis  of  a  sufficiently  steep,  hill-shaped  reaction  function,  the 
time  pattern  of  both rivals’ quantities mimics  a  random walk.  The first 
simulation  experiment  (I)  illustrates  this  point.  Exhibit  8  depicts  the 
series  of  supplies  of  firm  i  [the  Lyapunov  exponent  (L)  is  0.481  (5). 
In  period  t = 1  firm  i  starts  to  supply  close  to  monopoly  output 
(qi = 0.31). The subsequent reactions of firm i reveal a chaotic trajectory. 
The  series  of  firm  i‘s  supplies  fails  to  show  a  systematic  (periodic) 
pattern:  history  does not  repeat.  For example, the pattern  of  quantities 
from period  t = 105  to t = 109 differs qualitatively  from  the trajectories 
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Exhibit  8. Chaotic  trajectory. 
in  both history  and future. The time  pattern of firm  i’s  outputs mimics 
a  random  walk. 
4.3.  Sensitive  Dependencies 
The  second  property  of  complex  dynamics  can  be  illustrated  by 
assuming a small change in the initial conditions. The second simulation 
(11)  assumes monopoly output to be slightly below the first simulation’s 
level. Exhibit  9 shows that the  trajectory  of  rival  i’s  quantities changes 
dramatically  (L  = 0.49).  This  means  that  history  matters. 
Period t = 1’s monopoly output is slightly below the first simulation’s 
level  (42  is  decreased  from  0.31  to  0.30).  The  trajectory  of  firm  i’s 
outputs  in  simulation  experiment  I1  is  completely  different  from 
experiment 1’s  pattern. For example, any resemblance between simulation 
I  and  11’s  output  trajectory  in  period  t = 57  to  t = 65  and  t = 79  to 
t = 83  is  absent.  This  illustrates  the  observation  that  the  pattern  of 
quantities is extremely sensitive to minor changes (here a 0.01 reduction) 
in  the level  of initial monopoly output. Exhibit  10 shows that the same 
is  true  for  small  variations  in  the  value  of  parameter  cr(L = 0.49). 
The third  simulation  (111)  retains  monopoly  output at experiment  1’s 
level,  but  introduces  a  minor  reduction  in  ci  (c(  is  reduced  from  3.35 176  A. vun  Witteloo.riuijn and  A.  van  Licr 
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Exhibit  9.  Sensitive dependence  on qf 
L  6 
120 
Exhibit  10.  Sensitive dependence  on  c(. 
to  3.34).  A  sidelong  glance  at  Exhibit  8  and  10  reveals  that  a  0.01 
variation  of  parameter  tx  induces  a  radical  transformation  of  firm  i's 
output pattern. 4.4.  Qualitative  Breaks 
A  peculiar  feature  of  complex  dynamics  is  that  a  chaotic  trajectory 
is  associated  with  sudden  breaks  in  the  qualitative  pattern. The  fourth 
simulation experiment  (IV) reveals this feature as supply suddenly shows 
a  regularity  for  two  significant  time  intervals.  Exhibit  11 presents  the 
result  (L  = 0.48).  For  two  (short) periods  of  time  the  pattern  suggests 














Exhibit  I  I. Qualitative  breaks 
Experiment  IV  retains  a's  value  at -simulation  I  and  11's  level,  but 
assumes  monopoly  output  to  increase  from  41;  = 0.300  to  4; = 0.998. 
From  period  t = I1 to  t = 19  an  t = 105  to  t = 113  firm  i's  supply 
remains  almost  constant,  which  suggests  convergence  to  a  single 
equilibrium  point.  However, after period  t = 21  respectively  t = 115 the 
pattern  breaks  down  again. 
4.5.  Econometric  Dilemma 
Deterministic chaos poses serious problems  to econometric estimation 
(Baumol and  Benhabib,  1989). On the one hand, a time trajectory which 
is  extremely  sensitive  on  initial  conditions,  is  difficult  to  predict.  On 178  A. vun  Wittchosruijn  and  A.  vun  Licr 
the other  hand, it is problematic to distinguish deterministic chaos from 
stochastic  randomness.  This  is  even  more  relevant  if  one  recognizes 
Kelsey’s  (1988,  p.  12) observation  that  imposing  a  random  error  term 
on  a  hill-shaped  function  implies  that  chaos  becomes  more  common. 
However, (at  least) three  arguments can  be  put forward  to modify  this 
claim. 
First,  chaotic  trajectories  are  associated  with  (long)  periods  of 
regularity.  This  follows  from  the  feature  that  sudden  regularities 
characterize  the qualitative pattern. Second, new  econometric techniques 
have  been  (and  are) developed  to  test  whether  deterministic  chaos  or 
stochastic randomness  (predominantly) underlies  a  particular  time  series 
(Brock,  1986). Third, an additional  argument  follows  from the  specifics 
of  this  paper’s  application.  The  fact  that  individual  firms  can  offer 
a  chaotic  series  of  quantities,  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the 
trajectory  of  market  supply  is  dictated  by  chaos as well. 
First,  if  a  dualist  Faces  an  imitator,  the  firms’  chaotic  output 
trajectories  are replicated  at the  market  level. To  be  precise,  if  market 
supply  follows  from  the  summation  of  two  subsequent  moves  (i.e., an 
output  decision  of  both  rivals),  market  output  is  determined  by 
2 .  qi  + 6 (qi). Perfect  imitation  of a  dualist  [S (qi) = 01  implies  that one 
firm’s chaotic output trajectory  is duplicated at the market level. Second, 
if a dualist and perfect  accommodator are engaged  in  duopoly Cournot 
competition,  the  results  is  reversed.  The  firms’  chaotic  trajectories  are 
not  observed  at  the  market  level  as  market  output  follows  from 
q’  -+  1 -  qi  = 1. That is, perfect accommodation induces stationary market 
The implications for market output are not so obvious if two dualists 
compete  over  quantities.  Summation  of  two  subsequent  output  levels 
in  the  four  simulation  experiments  mimics  market  supply  (Q)  in  I 
a dynamic dualist against dualist game with doubled  period  lengths (7). 
Hence,  QT  = 9lT-[  + qiT:  that is, Q, =  qf  + 9<, Q, = qi + qi, etcetera. 
The four simulation experiments give the same result: the chaotic output 
trajectories  of  both  rivals  seem  to  induce  chaotic  patterns  of  market 
supply.  Bearing  in  mind  that  120  moves  give  market  supply  for  60 
periods (T=  I, ..., 60), Exhibit  12 illustrates this result for simulation 111. 
supply. 
5. COMPETITION  AND NONLINEAR  DYNAMICS 
This paper improves upon Rand’s (1978) and Dana and Montrucchio’s 
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Exhibit  12.  Chaotic  market  supply. 
output  to  be  positive.  Bulow  et  al.’s  (1985)  argument  indicates  the 
economic plausibility  of hill-shaped  Cournot reaction curves with positive 
monopoly profit. Future research  can  be directed  to at least two topics. 
First,  this  paper  ignores  the  dilemma  of  the  specification  of  cost  and 
demand  functions,  as  hill-shaped  reaction  curves  [Exhibit  2  and 
Proposition  13 are  postulated  on  the  basis  of  a priori  arguments. This 
raises  the  question  whether  there  is- a  (large)  class  of  economically 
plausible demand and/or cost functions which predicts such asymmetries. 
Second,  other  models  of  competition  can  be  analyzed  as  to  the 
(non)existence of complex dynamics, where the quest for chaotic regimes 
in  models  of  competition  is  not  to  be  restricted  to  one-shot  Cournot 
games. 
APPENDICES 
A. Dualist  Against  Imitator 
Proof of Proposition  I. Firm j  acts as a perfect  imitator, which gives 
(with  doubled  length  of  the  time  intervals)  the  following  difference equation  for  qi: 
For  the  sake  of  convenience,  qi is  replaced  by  I and  ri by  f: 
Second-degree polynomials with  the following properties are considered: 
max  f(x)  =,f(s*)  =  xm  = 1  with  0 < x* < I,  and  (A2.i) 
.f(l) = 0.  (A2.ii) 
OCXjl 
The parabola 
.fa(..)  = 1 -  a.  (x -  I  + I/&)2  with  a > 1  (A3) 
satisfies the conditions (A2.i) and (A2.ii) (then s*  = 1 -  I/&).  Applying 
Li  an  Yorke’s  condition -  ,f2 (xm)  [  =.f(O)]  <  x* <  xm  (= 1) - with  the 
further  restriction ,f(O)  > 0  (positive monopoly  output) to  the  parabola 
(A3)  gives  the  inequalities 
0 < 1  -a.  (I/&  - I  1 -  I/&.  (A41 
The inequality on the left  hand  side can be  solve  analytically and gives 
Numerically solving the inequality  1 -  a. (I/&  - 
is equivalent to a . ,,h + &  -  2 .  a -  I  2 0) imposes a second restriction  . 
on  the  parameter  a: 
I  1 -  I/&  (which 
tl 2  3.0795  ... .  (A61 
Combining  (A3),  (A4),  (A5)  and  (A6)  now  gives  the  result  that  the 
class of parabola’s 
.fm(-x)  = 1 -  a . (-x -  1  + 
and 
with  0 I  .Y I  1 
(A7)  3.0795 ... I  a < 4 
has  the  properties  (A2.i)  and  (A2.ii),  ,f(O) > 0  and  satisfies  Li  and Yorke’s  condition. Therefore, the  difference equation  (A  I) gives  rise  to 
chaotic  regimes.  Q.E.D. 
B.  Small Disturbances 
Proof  of  Proposition  2.  The reaction  functions 
(B1.i) 
rj(qi)  = qi + 6 (q’)  with  6 (0) > 0  (Bl.ii) 
are assumed. With  doubled  length  of  the  time  intervals the  output  of 
firm  i  at ((time f + 1 ))  is 
If  again  qi  is  replaced  by  x,  substitution  of  the  function  ,fm(x),  as 
indicated  by  (A3)  in  Appendix  A,  gives 
where  z  is  a  ((disturbance term)). If -the  function  ,fe  satisfies  Li  and 
Yorke’s  condition,  then  this  condition  can  still  be  satisfied  when  .fa  is 
disturbed  by  a  small  z.  So, if  6  (the disturbance of  the linear reaction 
function rj) is ((small enough)), the conditions for the existence of chaotic 
time  paths  can  still  be  satisfied.  Q.E.D. 
C.  Dualist  Against  Accommodutor 
Proof  of  Proposition  3.  Firm ,j acts a  perfect  accommodator, which 
gives  (with  doubled  length  of  time  intervals)  the  following  difference 
equation  for  qi: If  r’(qi) = I -  a.  (9j -  1 + I/&)’  with  0 < a  < 4  (reaction  curve  of 
a  dualist  with  positive  monopoly  output), (CI) gives 
If again, for  the  sake  of  convenience,  yi is  replaced  by  x, (C2) can  be 
rewritten  as 
x,+, =.f(x,) 
and  0 <a  ~4. 
with  .f(x) = I -  c1  . (x -  I/&)’ 
(C3) 
The function f(x) is a second-degree polynomial with maximum location 
x* = I/&  and  maximum  value  xm  = I.  Applying  Li  and  Yorke’s 
condition - ,f2 (xm) I  x*  < xm  (= I) - to  the  parabola  (C3)  gives  the 
inequalities 
Combining the  inequality  on the  right  hand  side with 0 <  CL < 4  reveals 
Numerically  solving  the  inequality  on  the  left  hand  side  (which  is 
equivalent to  c13  . Ji  -  4 . a3  + 4 . a2  . &  + 2 . ct2 -  4 .  c1. &  + I 2 0) 
imposes  a  second  restriction  on the  parameter  a: 
a  2 3.6708 ... .  (C6) 
Combining  (C3),  (C5)  and  (C6)  provides  the  result  that  the  class  of 
parabola’s  (composed  of  a  hill-shaped  reaction  function  with  positive 
monopoly  output and  the reaction  function of a perfect  accommodator) 
(C7) 
,f,(x) = 1 -  a  .  (x -  I/&)’ 
with  0 2 x 2 I  and  3.6708 ... I  < 4. 
satisfies  Li  and  Yorke’s  condition.  Therefore,  the  difference  equation 
(CI) gives  rise  to chaotic  time  paths.  Q.E.D. Cliuotic puiterns  in  Cournot  conipetirron  183 
D. Dualist  Against  Dualist 
Proof  of  Proposition  4.  With  reference  to  Appendix  A  this  proof 
can be brief. Appendix A proves that the function ,fu  (x) in  the difference 
equation gives rise to chaotic time paths. Two dualists firm i and i react 
according  to  the  same  reaction  function  (with  doubled  length  of  the 
time  intervals).  So, 
and  with  qi  replaced  by  x 
The  function .f,  v,)  gives  rise  to  (asymptotically  aperiodic)  time  paths, 
because  a  time  path  of .fUvu)  can  be  derived  by  skipping  the  ((odd 
terms)) in  a time path of ,f,.  Because ,f,  generates time paths with period 
k  (Proposition  I),  where  k  can  be  every  natural  number,  the  function 
.fuvu),  gives  the  same  result.  Q.E.D. 
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